A New Mental Health Act for India : An Ethics based Approach by Sarkar, Jaydip
104
Introduction
The Indian Psychiatric Society (IPS) has decided to draft
a new Mental Health Act (MHA) for the country and has
constituted a task force for this purpose (Kallivayalil 2004).
It is hoped that the draft would reflect the sometimes
competing needs of various parties to a MHA, such as
patients, doctors and the judiciary.  In a country like India
with its tradition of family support and help, there must be
consideration of the views and wishes of the family too.  It
is to be hoped that any new MHA would reflect the realities
of the 21st century, most particularly in the principles that
are enshrined in it and the balance it draws upon the
conflicting needs of protecting patients and public as well
as safeguarding the human rights of the patients.  One of
the primary reasons for the potential demise of the Indian
MHA of 1987 is the relative paucity in it of some of the
key features noted above.
Difficulties with Mental Health Act, 1987
The MHA ‘87 is an advancement on its predecessors, the
Indian Lunacy Act 1912 , The Lunacy (supreme court)
Act, 1853 (Act 34 of 1858), The lunacy (District Courts)
Act, 1858 (Act 35 of 1858), The Indian Lunatic Asylums
Act (Act 360 of 1858), The Military Lunatics Act 1877
(Act 11 of 1877), The Indian Lunatic Asylums
(Amendment) Act, 1886 (Act 18 of 1886), and The Indian
Lunatic Asylums (Amendment) Act 1889 (Act 20 of 1889).
In a nutshell, it has been suggested that the progressive
features of MHA ‘87 include, relative to its predecessors
(a) an incorporation of modern concepts of mental illness
and treatment, (b) primacy of the role of medical officers
(c) simplification of the rules of admission and discharge
(d) protection of human rights of the patients (e) providing
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for supervision of the standard of care in psychiatric
hospitals (by creating the Mental Health Authority) (f)
provision of penalties in case of breach of laws in connection
with welfare of the patients and (g) care is the ultimate
aim and not the custody alone (Banerjee)
However, the MHA 87 has had a troubled life ever since it
came into pragmatic being in 1993.  There have been
substantial critiques of the act, which has been labelled as
being i) overly legal in its scope, process and outcome,
stressing upon custody with little regard for therapeutic
aspects of psychiatric care, ii) establishing similar legal
controls upon both voluntary and non-voluntary classes of
patients, and iii) being discriminatory towards non-
governmental institutions of psychiatric care (Trivedi, 2002).
Another reason for the act’s unpopularity is its relative
silence on the more practical aspects of patient care that
psychiatrists face on a daily basis.  It is also true that many
patients in India are regularly admitted against their wishes
by psychiatrists on the basis of proxy consent provided by
friends and relatives and treated against their wishes without
recourse to a legally justifiable means of doing so.  Whilst
doing so obviously saves the patient, his/her family and the
relevant hospital administrative systems the onerous task
of navigating through the legal requirements that admitting
them using the MHA ’87 would require, such practices
nonetheless tacitly encourages the blatant flouting of some
sensible recommendations that the MHA ’87 contains.
Disregard for the norms and regulations of the act is thought
to have led to the horrific incidence of Erawady where
over a score of patients were burned to death after they
were left overnight, chained to their horrible fates.  Erawady
awakened the judiciary who thereafter insisted, following
directives issued by the Supreme Court, that the MHA ’87105
be implemented unfailingly in every state.  Whilst the
judiciary cannot be faulted for such a directive, it has
nevertheless led to a prescription of a pedantic adherence
to the letter and not the spirit of the act.  For instance, the
Chattisgarh Government has recently insisted that practicing
psychiatrists must obtain a license for running outpatient
clinics, failing which they faced the threat of closure (Trivedi
2002).  Such legal attention amongst other reasons, has
highlighted the multiple shortfalls and lacunae within the
MHA ’87 and the practice of psychiatry in India leading to
increasing calls from within the psychiatric fraternity,
represented by the IPS, for its root and branch reform rather
than minor amendments to the existing Act (Kala 2004).
Basic Principles of Mental Health Legislation
Promoting liberty, protecting individuals from harm caused
by those at liberty, and those not at liberty from abuse by
those who are, alleviating suffering, and restoring to health
those whose health has declined are all legitimate objectives
of a state as they reflect the values embraced by virtually
all members of a society (Eldergill 1997). That such values
will be reflected in statutes created by parliamentary
democracies is laudable, although doing so equally provides
the state with opportunities to intervene in people’s private
lives.  Allowing the state to use its powers in this manner
may have a negative impact if it produces erroneous laws
(albeit with good intentions) that are more likely to affect
the lay citizen than legislators who make them, and who
are thus less inclined to repeal them.  It is also the case that
mistakes made by individuals are relatively easier to rectify
than mistakes made by the law (judiciary) and it is well
known that politicians are more inclined than citizens to
make decisions based upon political gain and prejudice,
rather than principle (Constant 1988).
Mental health legislation tends to give power to one (or
more) person(s) over another which can be used, often in
a paternalistic manner, to abuse.  This risk of abuse is
multiplied if an individual is not free to escape, is
incapacitated or otherwise vulnerable, and/or their word is
not given the same weight as that of others.  For these
reasons, children and adults with mental health problems
are particularly at risk, and the law has usually afforded
them special protection in democratic western societies.
When enacting mental health legislation, parliaments in
liberal democracies have generally sought to create a
balanced legal structure that harmonises three key issues:
individual liberty (of the patient), providing treatment where
it is necessary and can prove beneficial, and protection of
the public.
This balance is pragmatically achieved by imposing legal
duties on those with power, conferring legal rights on those
within their power, and independent scrutiny of how these
powers and duties are exercised.  The effectiveness of
such schemes depends on whether, and to what extent,
they are observed.  This is a matter of constitutional
importance, for the observance of legal rights and the rule
of law are the cornerstones of liberal democracies.  The
rule of law implies the subordination of all authorities,
legislative, executive and judicial to fundamental principles
of justice, moral principles, fairness and due process.  It
implies respect for the supreme value and dignity of the
individual (Walker 1980).  It further implies that even beyond
a government enforcing and maintaining law and order, the
government is itself subject to rules of law and cannot
disregard the law or remake it to suit itself (ibid).
Involuntary Care of Mentally Disordered people
The foremost function of an MHA is to provide a
framework for the involuntary detention of mentally
disordered people in places of safety where appropriate
treatment can be provided to them.  There are many ways
of doing so but the most effective, practically and principally,
must be one that is rooted in ethical and legal principles,
based upon appropriate ethical tests that are clear, precise
and subject to legal scrutiny.  Any new law should impose
the most minimum powers as possible, specify duties and
rights, provide mechanisms for enforcing duties and
remedies for abuse of powers, be unambiguous, just in plain
language, and as short as possible.  In the following
paragraphs, a range of ethical and legal points are raised
and discussed with examples about modes of involuntary
detention, treatment against consent by patient, and
discharge procedures.  The focus is on the more practical
aspects of providing mental health care and ease of
accessibility and use of the act by all concerned.
1a) Capacity based test
One of the most significant of human rights is that of
autonomy.  Autonomy represents the inalienable power
of a person to make decisions that he believes are in his
best interest of his life.  Within a health context, an
autonomous person suffering from a disorder can choose
either to accept (provide consent to the doctor) or refuse
treatment even if the decision eventually leads to his death,
e.g. a cancer patient refusing treatment due to his
unwillingness or inability to tolerate troublesome side effects
of treatment.  One cannot forcibly treat that person against
his will, although professionals may concur that it is an
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erroneous decision, as it will amount to assault and battery.
The only way that this person can be treated, when he has
not consented to what is potentially going to be done to his
body is, if he is either unconscious or if it is demonstrated
that he lacks the mental capacity to make that decision.
Mental capacity to make a decision on whether to accept
(or refuse) treatment is based upon professionals providing
information to a patient about appropriate treatment, the
benefits and the risks (side effects, complications)
associated with such treatment, and any available
alternatives to the treatment.  A person is said to be mentally
capacitous if he is able to understand and retain the health
related information provided, believe it and be able to
balance the pros and cons of accepting (or refusing) the
treatment before arriving at a decision (Re M.B 1997).
Such capacity forms the basis for a valid consent regarding
any form of treatment, be it for physical or mental disorders.
A person with a demonstrably intact mental capacity can
even agree to or refuse treatment for physical disorders
when mentally disordered, suggesting that capacity is a
flexible and can vary in terms of what is at issue (Re C
1994).  When a person accepts treatment voluntarily then
there ought not to be any need to legally coerce him because
he is accepting the advice given.  The need to legally sanction
the treatment and detain a voluntary patient, a requirement
of the Indian MHA ’87, is therefore contrary to ethical
notions of what is just, fair and reasonable and can be
challenged in a court of law.
A capacity based test to determine involuntary admission
will insist that patients are only admitted and treated under
compulsion when they do not possess adequate mental
capacity.  People with dementia, mental retardation and
those with severe and florid psychosis are likely to lose
their capacity and not be autonomous in their choices as
they are unlikely to meet the necessary criteria.  However,
it is perfectly possible for someone with severe depression
who is also suicidal to fulfill all the criteria, be found to be
capacitous but refuse the treatment offered and thereby
pose a grave risk of self harm and completed suicide.  The
capacity based model, therefore, will allow a depressed
suicidal patient to avoid necessary treatment and be ethically
justified in harming themselves.  As is obvious this test
allows very little discretion to a clinician.
1b) Principle of best interest
When a person is capacitous, no consideration is given to
the consequences (to self or others) of their refusal of
treatment.  It is only when the patient lacks capacity does
the law turn towards the principle of ‘best interest’.  This
determines that although the patient is unable to (e.g due to
unconsciousness) or refusing (e.g. mentally ill) to consent,
treatment can still be given against his wishes as it is:
a) necessary to save life, prevent a deterioration or ensure
an improvement in the patient’s physical or mental health;
and
b) in accordance with a practice accepted at the time by a
reasonable body (often taken to be more than 50%) of
medical opinion skilled in the particular form of treatment
in question (Re F 1990).
Treatment in these cases is in the best interest of the patient
as determined by professionals, and is also referred to as
treatment under common law, i.e. law that is not grounded
in statute but one that has emanated on the basis of previous
practice.  Usually such practice is based upon the first
principles of medical ethics, one of beneficence to the
patient (Beauchamp and Childress 1989), which
emphasises that it is obligatory for a doctor to provide
treatment, if it can be provided and will be beneficial to the
patient who receives it.  ‘Best interest’ treatment is
consonant with a doctor’s duty of care towards his patient.
Most treatments provided in India, either physical or
psychiatric, is based upon this principle where the doctor
decides what is in the best interest of the patient, who on
his part often remains a passive recipient.
Treatment given to psychiatric patients under ‘best interest’
principle can only be legally defensible if he is floridly ill
and is a threat to his own self and that of others (e.g. an
extremely violent and psychotic patient brought to the
casualty department).  However that treatment must be
the minimum necessary response to avert any particular
danger that non-treatment may lead to, and administration
of such treatment cannot be an alternative to giving
treatment under the MHA.  In Indian MHA ’87, the Order
for Admission under Special Circumstances (section 21,
Part II), is an example of the use of the best interest
principle.  It is noteworthy that the Act makes no distinction
between patients “who does not, or is unable to consent to
admission” (Mental Health Act 1987, pg 15).  Choosing
not to consent when capable of doing so and not consenting
because one is incapable are obviously two different issues
and the law must take cognizance of it.
2) Balance test
This approach recommends drawing a balance of the ethical
considerations of autonomy/capacity on the one hand and
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consequences of one’s actions on the other (Eastman and
Hope 1988).  In this approach, a capacitous refusal would
be respected where the consequences of doing so were
not adversely very grave, but not where the consequences
were grave, thereby negating any primacy of the patient’s
best interests.  There would then be a trade-off between
autonomy and consequences and the extent of the trade-
off would depend on whether the adverse consequences
were for the patient or for others, with more weight being
given if the risk of adverse consequences were for others
rather than the patient. For example, a man with
schizophrenia would be detained involuntarily if there were
risks of harming others violently but another patient with a
similar severity of illness but without the specific risk of
harm to others will not be so detained.  There would no
doubt be a grading of risks on a spectrum rather than a
dichotomous determination – risk present or absent, such
that the risk of completed suicide would override the risk
of slapping someone in the face.
A variant of the balance model, described as a
‘discontinuous balance model’ (Eastman and Dhar 2000),
was recommended to the UK government for consideration
in its proposed amendment of the existing MHA of that
country.  It was argued that capacitous refusal should be
respected unless there was “… a substantial risk of
serious harm to the health or safety of the patient or to the
safety of other persons if s/he remains untreated and there
are positive clinical measures… which are likely to prevent
deterioration or to secure improvement in the patient’s
mental condition” (Department of Health1999).  The key
words are substantial and serious and their definition must
be determined if this test is the basis of any new MHA.  In
general, substantial means ‘very large in amount or degree’,
and in this case should represent a moderate to severe risk.
Definition of what constitutes serious harm is one for debate,
but it can be taken to represent any harm to members of
the public who will be unlikely to recover from it, either in
physical or psychological terms.  In terms of harm to self,
seriousness will be determined by the risk of suicide and/or
self harm, e.g. the possibility of genital mutilation by a
psychotic patient must be more serious than that of
occasional head banging.  As would be evident, it is difficult
to define these terms and it is best left to individual clinical
judgment with any definition acting merely to serve as
guidance.
3) Status test
The status test allows detention of persons against their
will even if they have a proven capacity to make a decision,
and when involuntary detention may not be in their best
interests.    In the English and Welsh MHA 1983, for
instance, the status is:
i) suffering from one of four recognized categories of
mental disorder (see under What is mental disorder?)
ii) that the disorder is of a nature or degree that makes
it appropriate for the patient to receive such treatment
in hospital, and
iii) that it is necessary in the interests of his/her health or
safety or for protection of others that s/he should receive
such treatment, which cannot be provided unless s/he is
detained.
It is possible that a patient may be suffering from a
recognized mental disorder but need not be treated in
hospital because he can be treated in the community.  As is
readily apparent, the status test grants substantial discretion
to those determining detention.
The application for a Reception Order (Section 22) of Indian
MHA ’87 (Mental Health Act 1987, pg 17) uses a status
test.  Clause 2a of this section specifies that patients must
be suffering from a disorder of a nature and degree to
make him liable to a reception order for involuntary
treatment, while clause 2b establishes the necessity test
where detention is ordered in the interests of patient’s health
and safety or protection of others.
What is mental disorder?
Every psychiatrist knows what mental disorder is.  However,
a stringent definition of this term is necessary for legal
purposes, the thrust and outcome of which can be very
different to clinical purposes.  Any legal definition of ‘mental
disorder’ must reflect a realistic understanding of what is
being defined and for what purposes.  An MHA is created
for the purpose of treating people against their will as they
have lost the capacity to make rational choices as regards
the need for and acceptability of treatment.   The definition
must be such so as to exclude those types of mental disorder
where treatment is impossible or ineffective, beyond which
any continued hospital detention will only amount to
incarceration.  At the very least, the definition acts as a
sort of entry into an MHA.  Only persons whose disorders
meet the legal definition can be considered for treatment
under the act.
The MHA ’87 defines a “mentally ill person” as “a person
who is in need of treatment for any mental disorder other
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than mental retardation”.  (It also defines a “mentally ill
prisoner” as a mentally ill person for whose detention in, or
removal to, a psychiatric hospital, psychiatric nursing home,
jail or any other place of safe custody, an order under a
relevant section of the Act has been made).  Merely being
in need of treatment is what constitutes mental illness in
the Indian MHA ’87.  Clearly, there are grave problems
with this definition because it casts the entry net far too
wide and arguably almost anybody who displays slightly
abnormal behaviour can be deemed to be detainable as
long as two doctors certify that he is in need of treatment
and a magistrate accepts their recommendations.  By
making a person detainable merely because it is felt that he
may be susceptible to treatment is a legally unsound strategy
because without a reasonable definition of what mental
disorder is, the law would be open to abuse. The history of
psychiatry reveals that mental health laws can be used to
masquerade incarceration as treatment and show
psychiatrists more as agents of social control than healers.
The experience of Soviet psychiatry of the communist era
demonstrated for posterity the risk of having definitions that
are open to misuse, where thousands of political dissidents
were admitted involuntarily to psychiatric hospitals in the
name of ‘treating’ them.  More recently the abuse of
psychiatry continues in China (Human Rights Watch 2002,
van Voren 2003).  Substantial criticism and resistance to
proposed changes to the existing MHA of a country has
been mobilized, where the government is proposing a
definition similar in its scope to the one within the Indian
MHA ’87 (Royal College of Psychiatrists 2002).
There are different types of disorders with different
treatment outcomes to which a legal definition of mental
disorder must apply.  The principle of beneficence in medical
ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 1989) emphasises that
in the treatment of a disorder, a cure should be pursued
ideally where attempts are made to remove the cause of
an illness.  Where this is not possible, control or remission
of the condition is desirable, failing which mere prevention
of deterioration of the condition can be a legitimate aim of
treatment.  Merely detaining someone in the hope that some
improvement can be demonstrated by virtue of being in a
secure environment in the absence of effective treatment
is unethical and cannot be allowed by law.  In view of a
changeable notion of what constitutes appropriate and
effective treatment of a condition, it then becomes necessary
to incorporate different categories of mental disorder when
a statutory definition is attempted.
A close look at the international classificatory system of
psychiatric disorders, ICD-10 (WHO 1993) reveals that
there are primarily four different classes of mental
disorders. These are:
1. Disorders of adults that are generally characterized by
periods of relative well being interspersed with manifest
symptomatology.  The commonest examples include the
affective disorders and schizophrenia even though there is
often a progressively deteriorating course.  These are
conditions that are largely treatable with medications, often
alone or in conjunction with psychosocial treatments.
 2.  Organic brain disorders, either congenital or acquired,
where the damage is irreversible. The prototypical disorders
in this category are the dementias (acquired) and mental
retardation (congenital).  Treatment can either control
certain undesirable symptoms of these disorders (e.g.
mental retardation) or arrest the progression of the disorder
(for a while) but not reverse the deterioration (dementia).
3.  Disorders of adult personality and of lifestyle (including
substance misuse, sexual preference, and some impulse
control disorders) which are only inadequately managed
with pharmacotherapy, often requiring specialized
psychological input to bring about symptom control, harm
minimization, or both.  Patients with substance misuse
problems that lead to frank Axis I disorders would fall into
both categories of 1 and 3.
4.  Childhood disorders where the nature and treatment
strategies are different to those of adult disorders, where
patients are most often dealt with outside of a legal
framework unless their disorders have features of adult
disorders and they are no longer minors.
The English and Welsh MHA ‘83 has four categories of
mental disorder, where a specific clinical diagnosis of mental
disorder is not required for involuntarily detention in hospital.
These categories are i) mental illness, ii) mental impairment,
iii) severe mental impairment and iv) psychopathic disorder.
The other three categories apart from mental illness have
the common feature of being associated with “abnormally
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct” and can also
include “impairment of intelligence” (Jones 2003, p 12).
Psychopathic disorder in this act is a legal definition and
does not translate into clinical psychopathy (Hare1991).  It
is merely the legal terminology for clinically diagnosed
personality disorder that has been associated with violence.
Under the English and Welsh MHA ’83, patients with
mental impairment and psychopathic disorder can only be
detained involuntarily if it thought that medical treatment is
likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of their
condition, reflecting the limitations of effectively treating
Jaydip Sarkar109
these conditions.  Any definition of mental disorder in a
new MHA in India must also recognise and reflect the
different categories of mental disorder and the differing
thresholds for treatment.  This would not amount to merely
emulating what exists elsewhere but would be a reflection
of the reality of psychiatric practice.
Difficulties with procedural rules in Indian MHA ‘87
 India has a long tradition of families carrying out many of
the responsibilities and duties that in a developed country
would properly be the role of the social services.  The
primacy of family (and indeed friends) has been recognized
in the MHA ’87 where except for patients who are detained
by the police (Section 25) and prisoners who are diverted
into the mental health system by court rulings (Sec 27, 29),
most other applications for involuntary hospitalization
become the responsibility of the family or friends of the
patient.
Despite the ready availability of the family to share the
burden of caring for the mentally ill, the process of seeking
and receiving treatment under the MHA ’87 is exceedingly
arduous, appears to be more penal and less therapeutic,
and can lead not only to isolation of patients and professional
alike, but also stigmatize them (Trivedi 2002).  Conversely,
it is also not unknown for families/relatives to abandon
patients in psychiatric institutions and never to take them
back again (Trivedi, 2001).  An MHA, by implicitly
discouraging mentally ill patients’ and their families from
using it due to procedural difficulties that it poses for users,
will lead to increasing stigma for the patients and their
families, thereby encourage the pursuit of alternative and
dubious forms of ‘cures’ and may lead to desertion of the
patients by their families.
Recommendations for change
a) A court based system:
One of the many requirements of the new act should be
the relative ease of navigation through it by patients, their
carers and professionals.  One of the major difficulties for
relatives is accessing the judicial system, particularly if they
are from rural backgrounds, ensuring in the process that
the appropriate court having jurisdiction for the area where
the patients hails from must be the one to be approached.
Should a new act persevere with the legal-heavy approach
of its predecessors, a major innovation could at least pave
the way for a simplified process of admission.  This could
be achieved to a substantial degree by ensuring easy
availability of the judiciary when it is needed.  Just as there
exists ‘lokadalats’ (although the rough and ready translation
is ‘public courts’, the real meaning of the term is courts
that are readily accessible by members of the public) for
certain kinds of disputes, a similar arrangement could be
made for mental health purposes.  The experience of one
non-governmental organization (NGO) suggests that such
an innovation is possible within existing resources. This
particular NGO, with unprecedented support from the local
judicial system, was able to provide a magistrate on its
premises, and more recently the chief justice of the Madras
High Court inaugurated the world’s first permanent and
continuous ‘lokadalat’ for mentally challenged persons at
this site (Sridhar 2003).
b) A doctor based system (quasi-legal model):
An alternative strategy to the above and one that seeks to
i) incorporate safeguards into the act, and ii) recognizes
the special expertise of psychiatrists in the treatment of
people with mental disorders, could form the basis of a
new act, one that dramatically shifts the locus and focus of
the act from courts and judges to hospitals and doctors
respectively.  Such an act would be accessible by patients
and their families, easy to use, responsive to their needs,
and involve handing powers to those professionals who
actually treat the patients so that they can make applications
(and indeed recommendations for eventual detention) should
family members be unavailable or unwilling to do so.  Such
an approach will not only prevent any potential for abuse
or desertion of patient by relatives, either during admission
and/or discharge, but also make the decision making process
much more transparent and clinically expedient.
Psychiatrists are especially trained and skilled in the
assessment and treatment of the mentally disordered.
Beyond pandering to a school of thought that may apprehend
abuse of powers, should certain members of the society be
bestowed with legal authority to detain other members of
public, there seems little logic and propriety that a judge
make an order for admission (and discharge) when s/he is
usually entirely dependent upon doctors, in order to arrive
at this conclusion.  The only exceptions must be cases
where the patient is involved in the criminal justice system,
either as an undertrial or convicted prisoner, and when he
is a person of no known abode and has been detained by
police.  Such changes will attempt to reverse the tone of
the current MHA being archaic, seemingly rooted in spirit
to the asylum acts of the previous centuries, anachronistic
and appearing to implicitly prioritise detention and custody
over treatment.
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c) Safeguards to quasi-legal model:
Safeguards ought to be built into the act such that legitimate
concerns within the judiciary (and possibly other sections
of society) about the potential for misuse of powers of
detention by psychiatrists, can be laid to rest by the
availability of a mechanism which would allow later
independent scrutiny.  Such scrutiny can be the role of a
tribunal whose primary function will be to review the
justification for the patient’s continued detention at the time
of hearing which should be reasonably close to the date of
detention.  This safeguard against potential unjustified
detention envisages independent review from both medical
and non-medical points of view and is best carried out by a
multi-member panel where a man of law (at least of the
experience of a senior solicitor) would preside over such
proceedings.  Such tribunals would have no jurisdiction over
voluntary patients who will be free to admit or discharge
themselves based upon capacitous decision-making ability
(Eldergill 1998).  Whilst the medical member will determine
the case for detention from a clinical point of view, the
legal member will review the case in light of the legal
definitions of mental disorder, and whether the legal tests
of detainability are met at the time of deliberations.  The
third member of the tribunal, a lay member of neither
medical nor legal background, will appraise the case as a
representative of the public reflecting the view of the laity.
This role can be conceivably carried out by social workers,
for example.  The tribunal ideally should arrive at a
unanimous decision, failing which the legal member must
have the power of veto in recognition of the legal primacy
of the body.  If the tribunal is not satisfied that the legal
criteria necessary for detention are met at the time it
deliberates, then it must recommend the discharge of the
patient.  Alternatively, it can allow the detention to continue.
A due legal process would consolidate the advantage to
the patient of having an easily accessible clinically driven
and legally sanctioned admission procedure, by
simultaneously making the decision making process
transparent, thereby making it ‘safer’ for the patient whose
liberty has been taken away.  The current act ignores this
aspect of safety to a person’s liberty as most often the
magistrate making the order does not examine the patient,
relies excessively on recommendations of doctors who can
often be non-psychiatrists with little or no expertise in the
assessment and treatment of people with mental disorders,
and without any scope for an independent scrutiny later.
The procedure recommended for change is therefore both
clinically and legally more sound and transparent.
Detention serves many purposes
Mentally disordered patients are admitted to hospitals for
many reasons.  They may be admitted for assessment of
their conditions, to determine whether they would benefit
from treatment through its trial, either in an elective and
planned manner or as an emergency, and perhaps also to
determine to what extent treatment is beneficial by
determining whether it brings about tangible benefit or acts
merely to prevent deterioration.  As discussed earlier these
are all desirable goals to strive for.  Some patients may
wish to discharge themselves after having initially agreed
to receive treatment voluntarily in hospital, or refuse
treatment once admitted even if they do not express a desire
to leave hospital.  Appropriate orders must also be available
for use against prisoners, either undertrial or convicted.   A
MHA should lend itself to the various clinical and practical
realities that a psychiatrist faces in treating his patient and
make available a range of statutory detention orders to
manage such contingencies as noted above.
Broadly, three separate sets of orders can feature in any
new act.  One set of orders would apply to those who have
are not involved in the criminal justice system (civil patients),
the other set for those who are (offender patients), and a
third set for patients who wish to leave hospital once they
are admitted.  The third option will not be available for
obvious reasons to those who are routed through the criminal
justice system.
Assessment orders for civil patients:
Assessment orders will allow the examination and
monitoring of a patient over a specific period of time in
order to arrive at a clinical diagnosis.  As stated before, it is
not necessary to provide a clinical diagnosis for the purposes
of detention, but it is inevitable once treatment options are
considered.  Duration of an assessment order must be
commensurate with the purpose for which they have been
made.  These should therefore be significantly shorter than
orders for treatment.  Patients detained under this order
should not be forced to accept treatment against their wishes
because the order is purpose-specific, i.e. assessment,
although should patients agree to receive treatment
voluntarily then it would be legally and ethically justifiable
to provide them so.  If provision of treatment is felt to be
necessary and unavoidable with the patient not consenting
to it, then it can only be given under the principles of ‘best
interest’ (of the patient) and ‘duty of care’ (towards the
patient of the treating doctor) for such treatment to be
ethically and legally justifiable.  As always, treatment under
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‘best interest’ principle must be the minimum effective
intervention.  Assessment orders should not be renewable
and must be either followed by a treatment order or by
discharge from hospital.  MHA ’87 does not appear to make
a distinction between assessment and treatment orders.
Section 21 order for ‘admission under special
circumstances’ comes closest to an assessment order but
allows treatment under clause 2 (Mental Health Act 1987,
p 15).
Treatment orders for civil patients:
Treatment orders must extend for periods longer than that
of assessment orders.  In many countries the initial order is
for a period of 6 months and is renewable thereafter; six
months in the first instance and then for periods of one
year (Jones 2003).  A separate order must be available to
cover for contingencies where patients need swift admission
from the community and insufficient time is available to
arrange a proper assessment.  Such an order (an emergency
order) can be made by any doctor (not necessarily a
psychiatrist in recognition of the necessary expediency) and
a relative/social worker but should not exceed for more
than 48-72 hours.  This would allow the necessary time to
convey the patient to hospital and arrangements to be made
for conversion into an assessment order (if still felt to be
necessary).  The emergency order will allow rapid institution
of treatment for patients who require swift removal from
the community.  The equivalent of a treatment order in the
Indian MHA ’87 is a ‘reception order’ although there is no
specific time frame for it, the order tending to run indefinitely,
until a decision to discharge is made (Mental Health Act
1987, p 19).  There is no equivalent to an emergency order
in the MHA ’87.
Holding powers:
There are occasions when patients having agreed to
voluntary admission initially, refuse to remain in hospital,
against professional opinion.  In such cases it has most
often been the case in India that patients are discharged
against medical advice (DAMA), a term that many would
be familiar with.  This practice is unethical and often allows
a vulnerable, needy (of appropriate treatment), and
potentially dangerous patient to be at large in the community.
A decision to DAMA can only be legally defensible if the
patient does not meet the statutory criteria for detention at
point of discharge.  If he does, then either the duty doctor
or the nurse in charge of the ward must have powers to
hold the patients until such time that a detailed assessment
under the act is possible.  Such holding powers are
necessary for members of hospital staff for brief periods
of time as senior psychiatrists can often be unavailable
(during nights, for instance).  A time period of 48-72 hours
is a reasonable time frame within which arrangements must
be made by the treating hospital for statutory assessment
to determine further detainability.  Nursing powers must be
less than that of junior doctors in terms of the length of
time that a patients can be detained for so as to reflect the
differences in legal responsibility of the two professions.
Orders for mentally disordered offenders:
There are two categories of patients that are involved in
the criminal justice system, those who have been convicted,
and the undertrials.  Whilst the former have been tried and
found guilty, the latter must be considered innocent until
proven guilty.  Different orders for transfer to a psychiatric
facility must be available to reflect this difference in legal
status.  Due to the involvement in the criminal justice process
orders for transfers to psychiatric hospitals must be made
by judges trying their cases in courts and not anybody else.
Similar types of orders as exist for civil patients,like
assessment, treatment and urgent treatment can be created
for this category of patients.
In view of the security that such patients would require,
certain hospitals can be identified in advance so that the
judge can direct the patient there, rather than to a general
hospital psychiatric ward with little or no security, for
instance. The security of such places can either be provided
by the police or nursing staff.  The former option allows
therapeutic relationship between staff and the patient to
develop and hopefully flourish, but brings with it the
presence of policemen in a clinical setting with obvious
implications for privacy, stigma and inadvertent anxiety to
other patients.  The latter option does not carry these
disadvantages but requires training nursing staff in security
measures and providing secure wards.  Experience within
maximum secure hospitals in England seems to favour the
later option.  However, any parole outside of locked wards
or discharge from hospital must be decisions that are made
by the judiciary or nominated substitutes of the judiciary,
e.g. the state home ministry.  Any unreasonable delay in
making such decisions can also be a subject for scrutiny by
an independent tribunal in order to minimize the effects of
bureaucratic red-tape.
Consent to treatment
While detaining a patient under a mental health act will
allow treatment to be provided to him under the aegis of
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the act (except when it is under common law in patients
admitted under admission order), such detention cannot
translate into indefinite treatment of the patient against his
will. The patient must have the unalienable right to either
allow or refuse another person to introduce what actually
amounts to a foreign substance (a prescription drug) into
his body.  Treatment against the patient’s wishes should be
possible when treatment (or emergency) orders have been
issued but only for a specified period (say three months) in
the act.  Beyond this period if the patient continues to refuse
treatment, a second opinion must be sought.
 Second opinions must come only from a psychiatrist, of
sufficient seniority and experience, whose name belongs
to a list that the local mental health authority can create for
this express purpose.  Second opinion should ideally not be
sought from one who is a staff of the hospital where the
patient is being treated.  When second opinion is sought,
then a written treatment plan can be made available to the
second opinion doctor, which will specify the preferred group
of drugs (antidepressants, antipsychotics, ECT), the number
of drugs to be used, and the likely duration (number in case
of ECT) of treatment.  Ideally and where possible the
second opinion doctor must speak with a qualified nurse,
the treating doctor (or his nominated deputy), another
professional who may have been involved in the patient’s
care (psychologist, social worker, occupational therapist,
etc) and review case notes, peruse the detention order and
treatment plan and examine the patient.
The need to seek second opinion is one of the mechanisms
that MHA in developed countries have created to enforce
duties on doctors, to ensure that proposed treatment is
consistent with what a majority of professionals in that
particular field would have recommended, and thereby
remedy any abuse of power.  It is conceivable that in the
absence of such a mechanism, a patient is liable to be
provided sub standard, experimental, out-dated or even
harmful treatment by doctors who may either be negligent
or overenthusiastic with an axe to grind, and thereby
(in)advertently abuse their authority, as has been the view
of many with the use of electroconvulsive therapy all over
the world. Ethically based MHA are created in a manner
such that more invasive and permanent a treatment and its
effects are, the more stringent the objective tests needed
to demonstrate the potential benefits of such treatments to
patients.  Thus, it is recommended that treatments like
psychosurgery or hormonal implants should require both
patient’s consent and second opinion.  Drug treatment of
mental disorder after the expiry of a pre-determined duration
(either by law or through guidelines by mental health
authority) must require either consent of the patient or a
second opinion.  For all other forms of treatment mere
consent should suffice.
Recently it has been claimed that there is an avoidable
overuse of electroconvulsive therapy in India and a public
interest petition has been lodged which seeks banning of
physical restraints and use of unmodified ECT in India
(Mudur 2002).  The petition is opposed by the Indian
Psychiatric Society (Dutta 2003), perhaps so as it may be
“often considered better to treat a severely ill, suicidal,
psychotic, catatonic, or drug-resistant patient with a
suboptimum form of ECT than to leave the patient with a
prescription which is likely to be less effective, and with
which he may not comply” (Andrade 2002).   This view
emphasises that a person potentially non-complaint with
drug medication can be forcibly given ECT against his
wishes.  Any suggestion or attempts to do so is unethical
and legally amounts to assault and battery even if the
intention is to bring benefit to the patient.  On an erroneous
basis a further argument has been made that many physical
procedures in other branches of medicine are
“overenthusiastically conducted” with “proven adverse …
consequences” , the implication being that if provision of
such treatments are deemed just and proper, the same
standards should apply to unmodified (my words) ECT,
otherwise “dangerous legal precedents could be set”
(Andrade 2002).   Such concerns are based upon ignorance
of the law and ethics of medical practice and tend to
mislead.  Decisions to undergo medical and surgical
procedures, even if felt to be unnecessary by some, are
made by patients who are deemed to be mentally capacitous
to make such health related decisions.  A severely mentally
ill person who is arguably not capacitous cannot be equated
with such a group of mentally sound patients and needs all
the legal and ethical protection that a society can provide
him for reasons that should be readily evident.
A proposal that would allow use of ECT in a legally
consistent manner is as follows.  If a person requires ECT
treatment, has demonstrably the mental capacity to make
that decision and is consenting to it, then he can be provided
this treatment even if it involves the use of unmodified ECT.
If he is incapacitous and/or refuses treatment, then
treatment can be provided under the ‘best interest’ principle
in urgent cases only, if it can be demonstrated that the
benefits far outweigh the consequent harm (primarily of
possible muskulo-skeletal damage and cognitive deficits).
Urgency can be defined as the need to save the patients’
life or for the safety of others. Treatment thus provided
should be the minimum necessary (not more than two, for
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instance), before arrangements are made to provide
treatment under the aegis of the mental health act.  If
treatment is not required on an urgent basis, then it can
only be given under statutory orders of a mental health act.
Whether unmodified ECT should be pursued is a matter
for the Indian psychiatric fraternity to deliberate upon.
Whilst there are short term gains for the individual who is
in need of urgent ECT treatment, the fear and stigma that
forcible treatment of this nature can create will in the longer
run deter all but the most courageous of patients to approach
psychiatrists in future for treatment.
The above guidelines seek to ensure proper legal and ethical
checks whilst allowing necessary treatments to be provided.
Hence, whilst a tribunal acts as the legal checkpoint to
test the validity of detention, second opinion and consent to
treatment acts as a clinical checkpoint to ensure the
delivery of high quality treatment, whilst simultaneously
respecting the patient’s autonomy (to refuse treatment).
As additional guideline to practicing psychiatrists, the various
mental health authorities can specify treatments for which
sufficient and rigorous data exists, and one that a reasonable
body of medical opinion skilled in the particular form of
treatment in question would use under the circumstance
(Re F 1990).  Thus if a majority (more than half) of Indian
psychiatrists favour the use of unmodified ECT then that
position should be steadfastly adhered to, only if rigorous
data of the highest order can demonstrate that there is no
significant disadvantages in unmodified over modified ECT.
Equally relevant to this debate is the view of the patients
and their families and a proper balance must be sought.
For instance, tubal ligation and/or vasectomy are effective
ways to control  an ever burgeoning population such as
India’s but to achieve population control one cannot forcibly
use these procedures on non-consenting subjects even if
the outcome would be beneficial to them and the society at
large.  Similar arguments can be made in relation to the use
of unmodified ECT for those deemed to be in need of it.
Integration with government’s health policies
The treatment of a person does not end when he leaves
the safety of hospital.  The lack of meaningful community
health services for psychiatric patients in developing
countries (WHO 2001) means that they become non-
compliant relatively quickly and hasten rapidly towards
relapse, whereupon they may be brought back to hospitals
under detention again.  We have a special duty towards
patients who have been detained, more so than others.
Those that have required involuntary detention suffer from
a more virulent form of disorder, have greater disturbance
of insight, can be relatively resistant to treatment and
demonstrate probably higher rates of violence directed
towards self and/or others.  They constitute the most
severely ill and therefore in need of assertive follow-up
when discharged from hospitals.  Whilst provision of any
community care is worthwhile, these patients (and their
families) can ethically demand in a compensatory manner
a higher quality of follow-up than what may be routinely
provided.  Such demands, were they to be made, would be
just as under a principle of reciprocity, one ought to provide
better standards of care than usual to those whose liberties
have been stripped.  It would be desirable for the new act
to specify that all those who have been detained must be
provided compulsory community care under the provisions
of the National Mental Health Programme [NMHP]
(Department of Health and Family Welfare 1982).  Failure
to provide such care can highlight deficiencies in service
availability and put pressure on government agencies to fill
such lacunae in health care delivery.  Community care can
be made a reality in India by means such as exploration of
the role of NGOs, local self governments institutions
(Panchayati Raj Institutions) and the potential for
partnerships between the public and private sectors in
delivery of mental health services (Lal and Vashisht  2002).
The right to have access to treatment in community under
the NMHP and National Health Policy can be interwoven
into a new mental health act such that the act does not
stand in isolation but is intricately interlinked with
government policies.  One of the many drawbacks of MHA
’87 is its relative isolation from governmental health
strategies and policies.  Reversing this trend will not only
help provide seamless and continuous health care services
to patients (including support and information to their
families) but also seek to make the act more a relevant and
powerful tool for its users (primarily mental health
professionals) and its intended beneficiaries (the patients),
not least through its ability to destigmatise the pursuit of
mental healthcare.
Conclusions
There is a need for a new mental health act for India.   There
are multiple deficiencies in the current act of 1987.  These
deficits are primarily due to the act being court and judiciary
centered with the attendant problems of bureaucracy, delays
and complications due to the enormous pressure on Indian
judiciary.  The current act gives little or no recognition to
the ethical principles of autonomy and reciprocity (providing
as good care as possible for persons whose liberty has been
curtailed) and appears to prioritise custody over any
meaningful treatment of the patient.
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Any new act must seek to redress the balance and
incorporate within it the notions of fairness, sound ethical
principles with adequate opportunities for the provision of
high standards of clinical care.  It must clarify the entry
and exit points in law of patients from hospitals and must
demonstrate equality to all classes of patients.  Most of all
it must safeguard the rights of the patient and impose certain
minimum duties on those providing care and treatment and
in doing so, recognize, acknowledge and prioritize the role
played by psychiatrists (as opposed to medical officers of
other persuasions and specialties).  Commensurate with
the duties of psychiatrists (and others) the act must also
give psychiatrists the powers to determine what is needed
to treat a patient (including the power to detain) such that
the act becomes more relevant to the daily clinical activities
of a psychiatrist, thereby ensuring a higher rate of usage of
the act.
Families and the community are two of the biggest resources
available to patients in India and all efforts must be made
to make the act easily accessible to them, at a time when
they need it and in a way that they can make use of it
meaningfully. Equally, the act must also seek to prevent
any abuse and abandonment of patients by families.  The
primary health (and social) care infrastructure must support
the family to develop and sustain their capacity to identify
and manage the mental health problems within available
means. Building knowledge and awareness of families can
make a real difference and to that end resourceful use of
health guides, anganwadi and health workers as also NGOs
can help raise awareness as well as provide advocacy,
support and even financial aid in certain deserving cases.
The new Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh has
assured the nation that his government will aim to press on
with economic development policies with a “human face”.
He and his government must be reminded that economic
development must parallel developments in other spheres
of Indian life, particularly that of social equality.  This vision
can be achieved by providing support and aid to the mentally
disordered people as they represent perhaps one of the
most socially disadvantaged groups in India.  As India drives
itself into the 21st century, it must update some of its laws
so that these reflect the needs of modern times.  Any
affirmative action on issues of social development and justice
will repay the effort many times over by minimizing if not
preventing the huge economic burden that mental illness
creates for society that contains it.
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